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Abstract Statements of degree appear to falsify basic doctrines in Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus. I offer a fresh formulation of the challenge and assess a solution pro-
posed on Wittgenstein’s behalf by Sarah Moss. I find that Moss’s proposal fails. The
proposal rides in part on novel interpretations of pronouncements by Wittgenstein
on the nature of the elementary proposition. I find that the interpretations cannot be
sustained but that Moss’s textual case hints at important and overlooked features of
the Tractarian program. I develop Wittgenstein’s comparison of propositions to mea-
suring instruments and apply it throughout, showing that it captures philosophical
commitments in Tractatus that otherwise tend to slip from view.
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1 Problem
Frege and Russell gave probing accounts of the proposition but left basic philosoph-
ical questions unsettled. What exactly is the relationship between a squiggle and an-
other part of the world when the former is true or false depending on how things stand
with the latter? How do two squiggles, or a squiggle and a sound, lay down the same
truth-condition? How can the truth of one squiggle follow directly from the truth of
another squiggle laying down what is apparently a different truth-condition? Frege
and Russell made advances on these and related questions in framing their logical ap-
paratuses, but questions on which definite advances could be made by applying and
retooling their apparatuses quickly dominated their attention. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, Wittgenstein tried for a ground-up account of the proposition and all
matters directly connected to it that left no philosophical issue in shadow unless as a
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matter of principle it had to remain so. The construction and fruitful application of a
logical apparatus was not his primary aim.
On a defensible telling of the story, Wittgenstein starts by conceiving the propo-
sition as a fact modeling other facts. This immediately prompts two questions. First,
how are the basic constituents of the model correlated with the basic constituents of
the fact that it models? Second, how are the structures of the two facts correlated? The
first correlation is supposed to be effected by convention: we assign a name to an ob-
ject so that the name can serve as the object’s proxy (Wittgenstein (1998) 3.22, 3.315,
passim; henceforth I cite Tractatus by decimal number alone). The second correlation
is supposed to be effected by the identification of the logical forms in the two facts
(2.2, 4.12, passim). The logical form of a fact is the space of possible combinations
of the basic constituents comprising it. A structure is a point in a space of possible
combinations.
Tractatus embeds these preliminaries in a densely interconnected network of philo-
sophical commitments. Two commitments concern propositions that Wittgenstein
characterizes as elementary, which for the moment we may take to mean that they
are truth-functionally uncompounded:
(i) Every elementary proposition is logically independent of the others, that is, no
elementary proposition or its negation can be logically inferred from any other
elementary proposition or its negation. (4.211, 2.06, passim)
(ii) Every non-elementary proposition is a truth-functional combination of elemen-
tary propositions. (5.3)
Attributions of color, of which there are typically more than two available, give no
obvious sign of being truth-functional compounds, yet they are necessarily incompat-
ible while elementary propositions are supposed to be logically independent. What
gives?
If (i) and (ii) were Wittgenstein’s only relevant commitments, he could allow that
color attributions are elementary and that elementary propositions can be necessar-
ily incompatible without being logically inconsistent (henceforth by ‘incompatible’ I
will mean necessarily incompatible and by ‘inconsistent’ I will mean logically incon-
sistent). But Wittgenstein also holds that
(iii) All necessity is logical. (6.37, 6.375)
Wittgenstein’s idea is that all necessary relations, prima facie material or otherwise,
trace to how propositions are compounded truth-functionally of elementary propo-
sitions, in other words, are formal. Combining (iii) with (i)-(ii) renders color attri-
butions a hard puzzle. Similar puzzles arise with respect to brightness, pitch, and
other matters of degree, but by custom they are referred to collectively as the color
incompatibility problem.1
1 A further word concerning Wittgenstein’s lightly-sketched logical apparatus is in order. Wittgenstein
extended truth-tables to a semantics for quantified formulas by admitting truth-functions with infinitely
many arguments. For a contemporary account, see Frascolla (2007). Rogers and Wehmeier (2012) show
that the primary notational constraints laid down in Tractatus – that compound formulas involve only the
N-operator, and that identity be expressed by sameness of name rather than via an equation – are jointly
satisfiable by a formal language equal in expressive power to first-order logic. Miller (1995) supplies a
Tractarian situation semantics with a truth definition materially equivalent to Tarski-style truth definitions.
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Tractatus gestures toward the possibility of logical analyses on which color at-
tributions come out as truth-functional compounds of elementary propositions, but
Wittgenstein gave up hope for such an analysis on his return to philosophy in 1929.
Still the prospect of an analysis of color attributions consistent with Tractarian com-
mitments – in short, a solution to the color incompatibility problem – continues to
tantalize philosophers. In what follows, I frame the color incompatibility problem
on fresh lines before assessing a solution proposed by Moss (2012) (with Carruthers
(1990) as an acknowledged precedent). I find that Moss’s proposal fails. The proposal
rides in part on novel interpretations of pronouncements by Wittgenstein on the na-
ture of the elementary proposition. I find that the interpretations cannot be sustained
but that Moss’s textual evidence hints at important and overlooked features of the
Tractarian program. Careful assessment of Moss’s proposal thus helps to restore the
color incompatibility problem to the philosophical setting that gives it significance.
2 Logical Analysis
No proposed solution to the color incompatibility problem can be assessed without a
firm grasp of the Tractarian basics, including commitments that constrain the range
of admissible logical analyses. We will gain a firmer grasp of the relevant basics
by developing Wittgenstein’s comparison of propositions to measuring instruments
(2.1511-2.15121).
A phase space is a geometrical model of the possible states of a physical system.
To each degree of freedom of the system there corresponds a parameter (dimension)
of the phase space, so that to each state of the system there corresponds a point in
the phase space. As an example, we can model a system comprising the colors blue,
green, red, and yellow as a one-parameter, four-point phase space. Of special interest
are phase spaces, called by Wittgenstein logical spaces, whose parameters are propo-
sitions taking values in {T,F}. Sets of points in logical space – or, as we will say,
regions (possibly empty) of logical space – are truth-functions, and truth-functions






Fig. 1 Logical space with parameters P1 and P2; truth-function P1 ∨P2 indicated by hatching and P1 ∧P2
by shading
tary if the fact that exists when the proposition is true is atomic (4.25). An atomic fact
is a ‘combination of objects’ (2.01) and an object is ‘the fixed, the existent’ (2.0271).
There will be more to say about atomic facts and objects shortly.
If the points in a phase space S are pairwise incompatible, by (iii) they must
be inconsistent. Tractarian logical analysis of S will yield a logical space L such
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that to distinct points in S there correspond disjoint regions in L . Conversely, we
can think of S as a coarse-graining of L , on analogy with the method of grouping
physical microstates that are indistinguishable relative to macrostate parameters.2 If
the logical space yielded by a logical analysis has all of its parameters elementary, the
analysis is complete; otherwise, it is incomplete. Every proposition, and by extension
every logical space, is subject to complete analysis (3.2, 3.205, 5, passim). A logical
space might have more than one course-graining, as the possibility of incomplete
analysis already shows.
Logical analysis yields a logical space, but it is not yet clear what counts as logical
analysis. Wittgenstein’s basic idea is that logical analysis unfolds definitions. Every
analysis is expressible in a definition (3.24), and in turn definition ‘shows the way’
to an analysis (3.261).3 Naturally, given that analysis unfolds definitions, ‘there is
one and only one complete analysis of the proposition’ (3.25). By extension, there is
one and only one complete analysis of logical space. Wittgenstein identifies logically
equivalent propositions (5.14ff). Coarse-graining preserves entailment relations, in
other words, a subregion of a region is coarse-grained by a subregion of the coarse-
graining of the region.4
We conclude with a simple illustration of logical analysis. The two propositions
of my idiolect, ‘a is single’ and ‘a is wedded’, are incompatible, hence there must
be a logical analysis that exposes them as inconsistent (the reason for the restriction
to my idiolect will be made clear in §5). By my definitions, a is wedded just in case
‘a is married’ is true and single just in case it is false. An analysis proceeding in
accordance with other definitions will be of something other than these propositions.
The analysis is complete if ‘a is married’ is elementary and incomplete otherwise. A
solution to the color incompatibility problem will be an analysis of color attributions
on these lines, unfolding color space into logical space via definitions. Note that
while the cardinality of a coarse-graining (in the present sense) might be equal to that
of the space it coarse-grains, as in this example, it also might be smaller, as when
an affirmation of the sibling relation analyzes into a disjunction of affirmations of
gendered relations.
3 Moss’s Proposal
We now examine Moss’s proposed solution to the color incompatibility problem, gen-
eralizing as Moss does from an example. Consider a color space C comprising blue,
green, red, and yellow (in attribution to a given object, which we allow to remain
2 See Ridderbos (2002) p. 67-70 for a historically-informed explication of coarse-graining. Coarse-
graining is now a standard technique in multiscale modeling across the natural sciences and mathematics,
useful, e.g., when measurement uncertainty precludes finer-grained discrimination and in abstracting sim-
plified subsystems.
3 Wittgenstein rules out idle definition as not genuinely definition (3.328).
4 In other notation, if the coarse-graining is a surjection ψ : L →S then for sets X and Y of points in
L , X ⊆ Y ⇒ ψ[X ]⊆ ψ[Y ], where ψ[X ] = {ψ(x) : x ∈ X}.
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Let Qi be the set of strings with 1 in the ith place. Regarded as a set of possible
worlds, each Qi is a proposition and logically independent of the other. Now consider
the logical space of which these propositions are the parameters. By construction
of the parameters, there is a correspondence between points in C and points in the
logical space (see figure 2). As the correspondence is stipulated (definitional), in-










Fig. 2 Moss-style analysis of C
Moss’s proposal generalizes straightforwardly to spaces of cardinality 2n for n> 2
and beyond them to spaces with continuum-many points. Moss generalizes to arbi-
trary finite cardinalities and arbitrary necessary relations as follows. Let arbitrarily
many propositions be given, with arbitrary necessary relations between them. Again
identify each proposition with the set of possible worlds in which it is true. Form an
Euler diagram of the propositions. Distinct zones in the diagram represent mutually
incompatible propositions. If there are 2n zones for some n, submit them to the pro-
cedure just outlined. If there are finitely many zones but not a power of two, partition
zones until their total number reaches a power of two and then proceed as above. If
there is no power of two between (inclusive) the number of zones in the Euler diagram
and the number of underlying possible worlds then, as Moss recognizes, the strategy
cannot be implemented.5
Whatever its merits, Moss’s proposal falls short as a solution to the color incom-
patibility problem even when the number of incompatible propositions is a power of
two. A solution to the problem will be a logical analysis of color attributions satisfy-
ing all Tractarian conditions. One condition, so far unmentioned here, concerns the
relationship between a proposition and its negation. A Tractarian proposition ‘shows
how things stand, if it is true’ (4.022). What this means in the case of a negative
proposition is not immediately clear. Wittgenstein begins to clarify it when he writes
5 Moss does not use Euler diagrams but elaborates an equivalent procedure (p. 846). I have streamlined
Moss’s presentation in other minor ways. Moss specifies the propositions in the four-color case as ‘that A
is red or yellow’ and ‘that A is red or green’, labeled P1 and P2, respectively (p. 844). Only for continuum-
many points does Moss label the propositions as I have done and interpose strings (p. 844-5).
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that to a proposition and its negation there ‘corresponds one and the same reality’
(4.0621). Further on he elaborates:
One could say, the denial is already related to the logical place determined by
the proposition that is denied.
The denying proposition determines a logical place other than does the propo-
sition denied.
The denying proposition determines a logical place, with the help of the log-
ical place of the proposition denied, by saying that it lies outside the latter
place. (4.0641)
Denial, logical addition, logical multiplication, etc., etc., are operations.
(Denial reverses the sense of a proposition.) (5.2341)
Simply put, ¬P denies that P. More elaborately, if we compare a proposition to a unit
magnitude (base unit, when elementary), the proposition’s negation marks the scale’s
zero, as ‘0 meters’ marks the zero of the meter scale.6
Now consider Moss’s proposal.7 Moss’s propositions are sets of worlds. Constru-
ing negation standardly, as complementation, figure 2 not only illustrates a mapping
between two spaces, it fixes propositional contents: Q1 says that yellow-or-red is true,
¬Q1 says that blue-or-green is true, Q2 says that green-or-red is true, and ¬Q2 says
that blue-or-yellow is true. On this approach, ¬Q1 (likewise, mutatis mutandis, ¬Q2)
does not correspond to ‘one and the same reality’ as does Q1, does not determine a
logical place ‘by saying that it lies outside’ of the place determined by Q1, in short,
does not deny that Q1. We might suppose that ¬Q1 is the Tractarian negation of Q1
given the occurrence in ‘¬Q1’ of the expressions ‘¬’ and ‘Q1’, but¬Q1 has been fixed
by stipulation, not by an operation on Q1. Moss’s proposal does not meet Tractarian
conditions on negation.
Moss’s proposal cannot be made to meet the conditions by simply reinterpret-
ing ‘¬’ on Tractarian lines. The Tractarian negations of yellow-or-red and green-or-
red are not-yellow-and-not-red and not-green-and-not-red, respectively. Blue does not
follow logically from the conjunction of not-yellow-and-not-red and not-green-and-
not-red, although on Moss’s proposal it is supposed to follow from ¬Q1∧¬Q2. Blue
is logically consistent with the conjunction of not-yellow-and-not-red and not-green-
and-not-red, but it is also logically consistent with (resorting to logical notation, in-
terpreted on Tractarian lines) Q1 ∧Q2, Q1 ∧¬Q2, and ¬Q1 ∧Q2. If in Moss’s pro-
posal we interpret ‘¬’ on Tractarian lines, the necessary relations among red, yellow,
green, and blue do not match up with the logical relations among Q1∧Q2, Q1∧¬Q2,
¬Q1∧Q2, and ¬Q1∧¬Q2.
Wittgenstein was prepared to relax his previous commitments when he took up
the color incompatibility problem on his return to philosophy, but relaxing Tractarian
conditions on negation does not salvage Moss’s proposal. Let us grant that figure 2
fixes propositional contents. If Q1 and ¬Q1 – that is, yellow-or-red and blue-or-green,
respectively – necessarily exclude each other, this owes to the incompatibility of each
6 Wittgenstein compares the negation of a proposition to the zero-point of a scale in discussions with
members of the Vienna Circle in the winter of 1929-30 (Wittgenstein (1979), p. 67 and p. 86).
7 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer of this journal for criticism that helped me to clarify the
argument in this and the following three paragraphs.
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of yellow and red with each of blue and green. If Q1 ∧Q2 – that is, yellow-or-red
conjoined with green-or-red – amounts to the attribution of just red, this owes to the
incompatibility of red with each of yellow and green (and blue). Stipulating proposi-
tional contents in accordance with figure 2 reduces inconsistency to incompatibility,
not the other way around.
Like negation in Moss’s proposal, Tractarian negation amounts to complementa-
tion, but over regions of logical space, not sets of worlds. Logical space meets con-
ditions that a domain of worlds need not, including (i)-(iii). Tractarian negation plays
directly on the resulting structure. This is why the Tractarian negation of yellow-or-
red is, and can only be, not-yellow-and-not-red. On Moss’s proposal, by contrast, the
negation of yellow-or-red is determined by whatever other worlds there happen to be,
a matter that Moss’s proposal does not make subject to logic.8
We do not have a Tractarian analysis of color to contrast with Moss’s proposal,
but if we admit as satisfactory the Tractarian analysis of wedded/single space in §2,
a concrete illustration of the difference between Moss-style analysis and Tractatus-
style analysis is available. We reduced the incompatibility between ‘a is wedded’
and ‘a is single’ to the inconsistency between ‘a is married’ and ‘it is not the case
that a is married’. A Moss-style analysis might stipulate that P is true just in case
a is wedded and ¬P is true just in case a is single.9 We can expand the example to
four points by incorporating two further possibilities: a might be not only wedded
or single but also engaged or widowed, where all four points are understood to be
pairwise incompatible and for simplicity we neglect the possibilities of divorce and
remarriage. A Moss-style analysis of this space might stipulate that P1 is true just in
case a is wedded or single, ¬P1 is true just in case a is engaged or widowed, P2 is
true just in case a is widowed or single, and ¬P2 is true just in case a is engaged or
wedded. By contrast, Tractarian parameters spanning the space might be that a has
been party to a marriage contract and that a is foreseeably to be party to a marriage
contract. On this analysis, a is single if a has not been party to a marriage contract
and is not foreseeably to be party to a marriage contract, a is wedded if a has been
party to a marriage contract and is foreseeably to be party to a marriage contract, a is
engaged if a has not been party to a marriage contract but is foreseeably to be party
to a marriage contract, and a is widowed if a has been party to a marriage contract
but is not foreseeably to be party to a marriage contract.
4 Elementarity
Moss frames the significance of the color incompatibility problem as follows: ‘If we
cannot analyze color propositions into logically independent components, then a for-
8 Cf. 3.42. Moss passes lightly over the differences between Tractarian propositions and sets of worlds:
‘[t]he ways in which genuine Tractarian propositions differ from sets of worlds are incidental to my dis-
cussion of the color incompatibility problem’ (p. 842).
9 More fully, map wedded to 1 and single to 0, then let P be the singleton set {1} and ¬P be the singleton
set {0}. The content of ¬P is not fixed by an operation on the content of P. It is as though we laid it down
that 0u = 1u′ for units u and u′: generally speaking this will not determine a conversion factor between
u and u′. Note that the number of incompatible propositions in this example is two, that is to say, Moss’s
proposal falls short even before we reach statements of degree.
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tiori we cannot completely analyze all propositions, and we must abandon the central
program of the Tractatus’ (Moss (2012), p. 844). This is correct. However, Moss not
only delivers (what is supposed to be) an analysis ‘into logically independent com-
ponents’ but declares the components – the propositions Qi – to be elementary. This
suggests that the bar a solution must clear has been raised from merely analyzing
color attributions to analyzing them completely. One now naturally worries that the
propositions Qi ‘do not have the right form to be elementary’ (p. 848). Moss antici-
pates the worry and offers that ‘elementary color propositions may be gerrymandered
disjunctions of simpler-looking color propositions, while all simpler-looking proposi-
tions are themselves non-elementary’ (p. 844). In turn, this is supposed to be possible
because Tractarian propositions are ‘simple only relative to a system of description’
(p. 849). Call this the relativity thesis. If it is true then Tractatus is due for whole-
sale reassessment, down to the principles that have been thought to generate the color
incompatibility problem. Before embarking on wholesale reassessment, however, we
will do well to examine Moss’s textual evidence for the relativity thesis.
Wittgenstein compares systems of mechanics – more generally, ‘systems for de-
scribing the world’ – to coordinate systems or ‘meshes’ used in the description of
planar figures. He adds that the world ‘can be described more simply with one system
of mechanics than with another’ (6.342). These and surrounding pronouncements are
commonly thought to develop, albeit impressionistically, some implications of core
Tractarian doctrines for our understanding of natural science. Moss takes them for
evidence of relativity. Close examination vindicates the common reading, and our
discussion to this point enables us to sharpen it.
At 6.341, Wittgenstein explains what he means in the discussion of meshes by
‘simple’: ‘It can happen that the description might have been simpler with the aid
of a triangular mesh [than with the aid of a finer square mesh]; that is to say we
might have described the surface more accurately with a triangular, and coarser, than
with the finer square mesh.’ The word here translated as ‘simpler’ is not elementarer
but einfacher, elementar(sätze) being reserved in Tractatus for propositions asserting
the existence of atomic facts.10 Moreover, the ‘surface’ under description in Wittgen-
stein’s analogy is not just any fact but itself a proposition (bild), and a system like
Newton’s mechanics is supposed to have among its purposes the imposition of a ‘uni-
fied form’. All of this suggests that Wittgenstein’s concern in these passages is not
logical analysis but rational reconstruction, in broadly the sense familiar from later
philosophy.
The suggestion is soon confirmed. Wittgenstein concludes 6.341 with the paren-
thetical remark:
10 The distinction between einfach and elementar is not clearly drawn in the notebooks but corresponding
passages in Tractatus show that it eventually sharpened. For example,
Die empirische Realität ist begrenzt durch die Gesamtheit der Gegenstände. Die Grenze zeigt
sich wieder in der Gesamtheit der einfachen Sätze. (Wittgenstein (1961) 26.4.16)
Die empirische Realität ist begrenzt durch die Gesamtheit der Gegenstände. Die Grenze zeigt
sich wieder in der Gesamtheit der Elementarsätze. (Wittgenstein (1998) 5.5561)
In English: ‘Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The boundary appears again in the totality
of simple/elementary propositions.’
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(As with the system of numbers [Zahlensystem] one must be able to write
down any arbitrary number, so with the system of mechanics one must be
able to write down any arbitrary physical proposition.)
The crucial condition on numeral systems is that they preserve factorizations.11 When,
therefore, Wittgenstein resumes by writing, ‘And now we see the relative positions of
logic and mechanics’ (6.342), one naturally suspects that truth-functional structure,
down to elementary propositions, is supposed to be preserved under change of mesh.
The sentences that follow show that it is:
So too the fact that it can be described by Newtonian mechanics asserts noth-
ing about the world; but this asserts something, namely, that it can be de-
scribed in that particular way in which as a matter of fact it is described. The
fact, too, that it can be described more simply [einfacher] by one system of
mechanics than by another says something about the world.
If truth-functional structure down to elementary components varied with change of
mesh, it certainly would assert something about the world that it can be described
using Newtonian mechanics, just as, if numeral systems were restricted to different
sets of irreducibles and their products, it would assert something about a number that
it can be represented in a certain numeral system. What Wittgenstein calls ‘change
of mesh’ is the substitution of one coarse-graining for another coarse-graining of the
same logical space. There is no reason to assume that one of them will be yielded by
logical analysis of the other.
In ‘Some Remarks on Logical Form’, Wittgenstein begins reckoning in earnest
with the color incompatibility problem. He considers and rejects an analysis of bright-
ness that turns on distinct yet interchangeable units:
If . . . we try to distinguish between the units and consequently write E(2b) =
E(b′)&E(b′′), we assume two different units of brightness; and then, if an
entity possesses one unit, the question could arise, which of the two – b′ or b′′
– it is; which is obviously absurd. (Wittgenstein (1929), p. 167-168)
According to Moss,
This passage shows that Wittgenstein does not reject his own gerrymandered
analyses of color propositions because they contain logical constants. He re-
jects his attempted analyses because they do not work. This is evidence that
Wittgenstein does not think that how we express a proposition in natural lan-
guage is a reliable guide to whether it is a viable candidate for being an
elementary proposition, in the sense of ‘elementary’ relevant to the central
project of the Tractatus. (Moss (2012), p. 849)
Two paragraphs further on, Moss observes that Wittgenstein is ‘sanguine about using
apparently complex propositions to analyze apparently simple ones’ and offers as
11 ‘Numeral system’ is a more apt translation of Zahlensystem than Ogden’s ‘system of numbers’ or
Pears’s and McGuinness’s ‘number-system’. Concerning a numeral system it makes sense to insist that
‘one must be able to write down any arbitrary number’, concerning a number system it does not. Note that
Wittgenstein’s analogy does not require that the numbers in question be uniquely factorizable, although if
they are then the analogy to propositions is closer given his commitment to unique logical analyzability.
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the most plausible explanation of this fact Wittgenstein’s putative commitment to
relativity.
These interpretations are strained. In the passage from ‘Some Remarks on Log-
ical Form’, Wittgenstein entertains an analysis of E(2b) on which E(b′)∧E(b′′) is
the analysans. He observes that E(1b) then forces a choice between E(b′) and E(b′′).
These propositions must be logically equivalent yet distinct, an ‘absurd’ consequence
given the identification of equivalent propositions. Wittgenstein remains sanguine
about using a truth-functional compound to analyze something apparently simple
for the unremarkable reason that analysis makes otherwise hidden structure explicit
(4.002). I will say a bit more in the next section about what it means for structure to
be hidden.
These are two key passages offered by Moss as evidence for the relativity thesis.
A third passage demands separate treatment, as it involves very different issues.12
5 Solipsism
Moss quotes an exclamation from 1915 culminating seven weeks of reflection on the
simplicity of objects: ‘This object is simple for me!’ (Wittgenstein (1961), 22.6.15—
henceforth entries in Wittgenstein (1961) are cited by date only). Insofar as objects
make up atomic facts and atomic facts are described by elementary propositions, this
exclamation does sound like possible evidence for the relativity thesis. To assess it,
we will start with Wittgenstein’s views on the subject (‘me’) and work our way back
to objects.
Wittgenstein holds that ‘the subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of
the world’ (5.632). Accordingly, he characterizes the subject only negatively (5.631).
12 A short survey of usages of the term ‘elementary’ in the literature surrounding Tractatus might be
found useful. In Russell and Whitehead (1910), the term covers truth-functional compounds:
By an “elementary” proposition we mean one which does not involve any variables, or, in other
language, one which does not involve such words as “all,” “some,” “the” or equivalents for such
words. (p. 95)
So Russell and Whitehead can write, for example, ‘If p is an elementary proposition, ∼p is an elementary
proposition’ (∗1·7, p. 101). In a 1913 letter to Russell, Wittgenstein acknowledges their usage:
But the propositions of logic – and only they – have the property that their truth or falsity, as the
case may be, finds its expression in the very sign for the proposition. I have not yet succeeded
in finding a notation for identity that satisfies this condition; but I have NO doubt that it must
be possible to find such a notation. For compound propositions (“elementary propositions”) the
ab-notation is sufficient. (Wittgenstein (1995), p. 60)
(See Lampert (2017) for recent discussion of the ab-notation.) Wittgenstein never acknowledges in Trac-
tatus that he departs from Russell and Whitehead’s usage; given the 1913 letter and Principia’s authority,
one might wonder why. By the time of Tractatus, Wittgenstein is convinced that ‘all propositions are
results of truth-operations on the elementary propositions’ (5.3) while, in turn, elementary propositions
are uncompounded. So the distinction between truth-functional compounds and quantified propositions –
entirely natural in the context of the theory of types – collapses, and the label ‘elementary proposition’,
which before marked one side of the distinction, is available for other use. By 1919 Wittgenstein takes his
redeployment of the label for granted: ‘Of course no elementary props are negative’ (letter to Russell, in
Wittgenstein (1995) p. 126). When Ramsey later reverts to Russell’s usage, he is careful to note this fact
(Ramsey (1926), footnote on p. 341). Nowhere known to me do these authors suggest that a proposition
might be truth-functionally compound or simple in a relative sense.
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But while the subject is beyond positive description, ‘there remains the reality coor-
dinated with it’ (5.64), and this we can positively characterize. Coordination between
subject and reality is effected via language, whose limits coincide with reality’s:
That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the lan-
guage (the language which I understand) mean [bedeuten] the limits of my
world. (5.62)
At the limits of language sit elementary propositions, and what the simple parts of
elementary propositions refer to – ‘the limits of my world’ – are objects:
Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The boundary appears
again in the totality of elementary propositions. (5.5561)
If an elementary proposition is false then the atomic fact that would exist if the propo-
sition were true does not exist, but the objects named in the elementary proposition
exist in any case (2.014). This is why the limits of language mean objects rather than
atomic facts.
We come now to the sense in which objects are dependent for their simplicity on
the subject. Wittgenstein states directly how the limits of language are settled: ‘[t]he
application [Anwendung] of logic decides what elementary propositions there are’
(5.557). Wittgenstein uses the word Anwendung mostly in connection with logical
operations, as when he writes that ‘truth-functions are results of the successive ap-
plication of a finite number of truth-operations to elementary propositions’ (5.32).
On this usage, both the logical analysis of a proposition and the buildup of logical
space by truth-functionally compounding the proposition with other propositions are
applications of logic. But there is a further connection in which Wittgenstein speaks
of application:
The name cannot be analysed further by any definition. It is a primitive sign.
(3.26)
What does not get expressed in the sign is shown by its application. What the
signs conceal, their application declares. (3.262)
These uses of the term Anwendung prompt two questions. First, how does the applica-
tion of logic ‘decide’ what elementary propositions there are? Second, is it the same
sort of application that ‘declares’ a sign to be primitive?
Wittgenstein addresses both questions at one go in entries that predate by a few
days the exclamation quoted by Moss. The entries call for reproduction in full:
[W]hat we mean by “complex objects do not exist” is: It must be clear in
the proposition how the object is composed, so far as it is possible for us to
speak of its complexity at all.—The sense of the proposition must appear in
the proposition as divided into its simple components—. And these parts are
then actually indivisible, for further divided they just would not be THESE.
In other words, the proposition can then no longer be replaced by one that has
more components, but any that has more components also does not have this
sense.
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When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition
itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components—no fur-
ther division is possible and an apparent one is superfluous—and these are
objects in the original sense. (17.6.15)
But suppose that a simple name denotes an infinitely complex object? For ex-
ample, perhaps we assert of a patch in our visual field that it is to the right of
a line, and we assume that every patch in our visual field is infinitely com-
plex. Then if we say that a point in that patch is to the right of the line, this
proposition follows from the previous one, and if there are infinitely many
points in the patch then infinitely many propositions of different content follow
LOGICALLY from that first one. And this of itself shews that the proposition
itself was as a matter of fact infinitely complex. That is, not the propositional
sign by itself, but it together with its syntactical application [Verwendung].
(18.6.15)
A sign is structured in accordance with the inferences licensed by its occurrence. To
declare ‘the patch’ complex in ‘the patch is to the right of the line’ is to decide that the
region of logical space occupied by the proposition requires more than one parameter
for its specification. The smaller the region, the larger the number of regions that
contain it, that is, the more it entails.13 Whether an expression is truth-functionally
compound or elementary has nothing directly to do with whether it displays a logical
constant – its ‘apparent simplicity’ – but everything to do with its application.
Let us consider an example. Recall the analysis of wedded/single space in §2:
a is wedded just in case a is married and single just in case a is not married. As
I noted there, the analysis proceeds in accordance with definitions in my idiolect.
Further definitions, fixed by my ‘syntactical application’ of the relevant expressions,
will decide whether ‘a is married’ is elementary or compound. In accordance with the
principle of unique logical analyzability, the proposition will vary with the analysis.
Which proposition I settle on is subject to no external constraint but is definitional
and immediately given (‘this sense’). The identity of logical form in a proposition
and in the fact that it describes entails that any idiolect that would model another will
assimilate the other, up to superficial differences of sign (4.025). The relativization
of objects to the subject thus passes over into solipsism. Solipsism might be said to
narrow the scope of the color incompatibility problem but it does not support the
relativity thesis.
13 Wittgenstein hints in the notebooks at an information-theoretic interpretation of volume in logical
space:
For what I should now have to do is to find an expression in the language of this theory for HOW
MUCH a proposition says. And this would have to yield the result that tautologies say NOTHING.
But how can we find the measure of amount-that-is-said? (2.6.15)
One could certainly say: That proposition says the most from which the most follows. (3.6.15)
A similar notion is glimpsed in Frege (1980), where Frege comments that ‘the content of a concept dimin-
ishes as its extension increases’ (§29). This notion coincides with neither sinn nor bedeutung, which Frege
distinguished only in later work. Frege does not bring the notion to bear on the concept x 6= x when he uses
x 6= x to define 0 (§74). One naturally wonders if Wittgenstein’s information-theoretic idea was inspired
by Frege’s comment. Traces of the idea survive in Tractatus, e.g., in the account of conditional probability
(5.15).
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Wittgenstein’s notebooks seem to offer support of another kind to the relativity
thesis. Wittgenstein was seized for a time by the idea that ‘[i]t must be through gener-
ality that ordinary propositions get their stamp of simplicity’ (26.4.15). On this view,
names generalize over facts concerning their bearers, as the name of a city might be
thought to generalize over possible street plans (cf. 30.5.15). If this is so then names
might introduce logical complexity, possibly even into propositions that nevertheless
qualify as elementary.
Whatever its interest, this avenue to the relativity thesis is closed. The residue
in Tractatus of Wittgenstein’s early idea about names is a mostly unremarked du-
ality between names and tautology. Names do not stand for facts (3.144), and nei-
ther does tautology (5.142). Tautology ‘allows every possible state of affairs’ (4.462),
while objects, for which names go proxy, ‘contain the possibility of all states of af-
fairs’ (2.014; cf. 2.021-2.024). ‘The simple signs employed in propositions are called
names’ (3.2202), but tautologies, too, ‘cannot be combinations of signs at all’ (4.466).
‘Names resemble points; propositions resemble arrows, they have sense’ (3.144), but
tautology, which is ‘without sense’, resembles both a ‘substanceless centre’ (5.143)
and ‘the point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions’ (4.461). Like
Blake’s grain of sand, Tractarian names are world-encompassing. This gives no sup-
port to the relativity thesis. Tautology follows from everything and entails nothing
but itself, in other words, it is logically idle. Recalling the close tie between structure
and inference, one sees why Wittgenstein would go as far as to write that unfalsifiable
expressions ‘cannot be combinations of signs at all’.
There is a possible objection to the reading of Tractatus that I have been offering.
Wittgenstein makes it clear that objects are meant to anchor propositions, conceived
as expressions of truth-conditions by means of signs with unconditional reference:
If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would
depend on whether another proposition was true. (2.0211)
It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world (true or false).
(2.0212)
According to Glock, Tractarian objects are supposed to be able to serve this function
because they are ‘indestructible’ (Glock (1996) p. 269). If Wittgenstein relativizes
objects to the subject as I have argued that he does, it makes no more sense for him to
say that objects are indestructible than it does for him to say that they are destructible:
they are conditions on sense decided by syntactical application, not items satisfying
a description (‘indestructible’). So, if Glock is right, and if the sense in which Trac-
tarian objects are indestructible is just the sense in which, on my reading, they are
neither indestructible nor destructible, then my reading is incorrect and the passages
cited by Moss might yet support the relativity thesis.
Glock provides no direct textual evidence that Tractarian objects are indestruc-
tible, but Wittgenstein (2009) §46ff seems to promise the strongest case, albeit ret-
rospective. In §46, Wittgenstein quotes Theaetetus to the effect that ‘it is impossible
to give an account of any primary element; for it, nothing is possible but the bare
name’. Immediately he adds that ‘Russell’s “individuals” and my “objects” (Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus) were such primary elements’. In §50, Wittgenstein introduces
the idea of indestructibility:
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What does it mean to say that we can attribute neither being nor non-being
to elements?—One might say: if everything that we call “being” and “non-
being” consists in the existence and non-existence of connexions between el-
ements, it makes no sense to speak of an element’s being (non-being); just as
when everything that we call “destruction” lies in the separation of elements,
it makes no sense to speak of the destruction of an element.
Wittgenstein does not say here that Tractarian objects were supposed to be indestruc-
tible. He dramatizes, in a metaphysical register, what in Tractatus he did maintain:
‘it makes no sense to speak of an element’s being (non-being)’. This way of drama-
tizing the Tractarian doctrine was not new in Philosophical Investigations: soon after
his return to philosophy, Wittgenstein wrote that ‘[i]f someone says that substance is
indestructible, then what he is really after is that it is senseless in any context to speak
of “the destruction of a substance”—either to affirm or deny it’ (Wittgenstein (1975)
§95). Possibly this is the view that Glock wished to attribute to Wittgenstein. Be that
as it may, there is no objection on grounds of the indestructibility of objects to the
readings that I have offered, hence also no reason to suspect previously unrecognized
commitments in Tractatus that might obviate the objections I have raised to Moss’s
proposal.
6 Conclusion
Haim Gaifman once emphasized in conversation with me that Wittgenstein’s aim in
Tractatus was philosophical rigor, not technical rigor. Contemporary discussion of
the work sometimes focuses on technical details at the expense of philosophy. One
ostensibly technical challenge that cannot be rightly understood absent a clear view
of the work’s philosophical underpinnings is the color incompatibility problem. A
solution to the problem will be a logical analysis of color attributions resting stably
on those underpinnings, among them:
(a) the dependence of the proposition on its logical analysis;
(b) the dependence, in turn, of logical space on elementary propositions;
(c) the relation between propositions and their negations;
(d) the difference between ‘change of mesh’ and logical analysis; and,
(e) the relativization of logical form to the subject via application.
These are the underpinnings on which I have focused in this paper.
My discussion has been guided throughout by Wittgenstein’s comparison of propo-
sitions to measuring instruments.14 Measurement is, one might quip, a model of the
modeling relation that lies at the center of Wittgenstein’s concern. This ‘model of
modeling’ admits extension to a model of logical space and then again to a model of
logical analysis. The quip goes lame, however, in suggesting that the relation between
a Tractarian proposition and what it models might be subject to genuine modeling,
that is to say, description. The relation between a Tractarian proposition and what
14 I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers of this journal for spurring me to the reflections in this and
the following paragraphs.
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it models is no more a fact fit for description – no more a material relation – than
Tractarian objects are indestructible. The comparison to measurement forms part of
the ladder that Wittgenstein means his readers to kick away.
The kicking is to be done after climbing. Measurement boasts features that are
seldom overlooked but whose analogues in thought – in ‘projecting’ possible states
of affairs (3.11) – do easily slip from view. No fabric dealer forgets that the sum of
two numbers is realized in the repeated controlled displacement of a rod relative to a
stretch of fabric. Even a notion as abstract as the zero of a scale is without much ado
understood concretely through the unit, so that no one boggles at the fact that, say,
0◦C 6= 0◦F. When Wittgenstein compares propositions to measuring instruments, he
is drawing attention to the concreta that realize logical space.
More specifically, the comparison to measurement illuminates each of (a)-(e),
and not only singly but in their intricate mutual relations. That classical force and
momentum are different is shown by the equations F = ma and p = mv, with v hav-
ing dimension length × time−1 and a having dimension length × time−2.15 In order
for a numerical magnitude to represent a force or momentum, base units must still
be chosen, units that, in turn, are realized in the application of physical instruments.
Similarly, the content of a point of logical space is fixed by the application of ele-
mentary propositions realized in signs. Thus (a) and (b) are figured together in the
comparison to measurement, and with them (c)-(e): the relation of a proposition to
its negation, analogous to the relation between a scale and its zero; the possibility of
changing ‘meshes’, analogous to the possibility of alternative coarse-grainings; and
the relativization of logical space to the subject via application, analogous – with
dramatic caveats – to the relativization of a physical system to the investigator via the
choice of base quantities and units.
It is worth underscoring how evident the misreadings of Tractatus that we have
considered in this paper become when examined in light of the comparison to mea-
surement, or put another way, how much of the philosophical spirit of Tractatus the
comparison captures. One might distinguish abstractly between a proposition and
its negation and then assign them incompatible fragments of color space as their
contents, but few will be tempted to stipulate the physical content of a scale’s zero
independently of the unit. Or again, one might imagine that a proposition’s truth-
functional structure varies with one’s choice of ‘mesh’, but one does not come natu-
rally by the idea that the points in a region of phase space change according to one’s
choice of coarse-graining. Spotting one misunderstanding in light of the comparison
to measurement, the others leap to view.
Moss’s proposed solution to the color incompatibility problem fails, but I hope
to have shown that serious engagement with the issues it raises conduces to deeper
understanding of Tractatus and, thereby, to deeper insight into issues of contemporary
interest in philosophy of logic.
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